The US did intervene in East Timor. On the aggressors side of course. It's very difficult for the UN to work in the way you describe, because it serves so often as an extension of US power. On thing that might help a bit would be to move the UN to someplace like Brasilia, or Reykjavik or Geneva... but that's unlikely to happen, and I do think the US control is slipping and will continue to slip.
I did have to wonder what the intent and consequences of this Z article are.
Because, as Alexander Cockburn is fond of pointing out, liberals and perhaps "progressives" (a group he mocks as a denatured, unprincipled descendants of the radicals of yore) are jonesing for a war they can get behind, and it looks like this could be the one. The Z article could have the consequence of strengthening this position - Chomsky says we're responsible for the predictable consequence of our actions, and I agree. I think he made the argument in the context of people writing articles about restrictions of press freedom in Nicaragua, while failing to mention US terror intervention in the country. It has the consequence of creating the illusion in people's minds that the US efforts there are noble. We have a responsibility for our government's actions, and as moral agents that's where we should concentrate our criticism and analysis. I find this reasonable and easy-to-understand principle to be incomprehensible to most of my fellow Americans. (Just as they find it incomprehensible that Ghaddafi and Saddam don't have anything over Clinton and the Bushes in the monster department. Our new guy seems hell-bent to prove he should have a prominent position in the club, too).
As for Libyan intervention, I think it does take a certain amount of shoehorning to get this ugly stepsister's foot into the glass slipper, and the propaganda system is going overtime on it. Some of it's easy to see through - the way coverage up uprisings in other countries have almost disappeared as they focus all their energy on the designated enemy, claims that rebels practically LOVE being NATO's collateral damage... it's kind of odd that nobody seems to have any problem with that. Nobody that gets to talk to us anyway.
Cockburn's take on the nature and scope of the conflict is radically different that most other sources, and seems based on scant evidence (the reappearance of the same tank in multiple news stories, for example. But we have to remember that the foundation for unraveling the fictional propaganda account of the pulling down of Saddam's statue was built on a careful analysis of photographs of the event. Cockburn also allows himself the rare mention that he was the first to challenge the false propaganda story of babies being thrown from incubators in Kuwait by the monster Saddam. He didn't mention that he was hammered from left and right for it - on the left, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch declared him to be a fellow monster with Saddam. Of course, over time we learned that he was exactly right, and they were exactly wrong. I doubt he ever got a single apology - better just to stuff these things down the memory hole and move on, and repeat the same mistakes over and over again.
Anyway, interesting and thought provoking reading:
http://counterpunch.org/cockburn04012011.html
http://counterpunch.org/cockburn04152011.html
One thing that really stood out for me (because it supports a pet theory of mine):
"Ellen Brown, author of the terrific Web of Debt: the Shocking Truth About Our Money System and How We Can Break Free, wrote recently about the rebels' sophisticated financial operations in the following terms: 'According to a Russian article titled "Bombing of Lybia – Punishment for Ghaddafi for His Attempt to Refuse US Dollar," Gadaffi made a similarly bold move: he initiated a movement to refuse the dollar and the euro, and called on Arab and African nations to use a new currency instead, the gold dinar.'"
Please go to the article and read the rest of it. As for my pet theory, I think that whatever else Saddam did (and he did bad things, we always have to say that first, and once we've said it, we have to repeat it forever and ever), he painted a target on his chest when he tried to take Iraq off the US dollar in 1972.
The US government doesn't always get it's way right away, but they remember everything, and sooner or later they make an attempt to "set things right." Citizens are always taken by surprise, because we're so de-politicized we don't know whats happening, or didn't understand the implications of something when it did. Furthermore, we forget everything in about 3 weeks. With this state of affairs, how can "We the people" hope to have any control at all over our employees?
I've heard it said that the winners of the world can forget history, while the losers keep track... remembering old scores for hundreds of years. I always accepted that, but my thinking has changed. The winners in our system remember everything, and the losers remember nothing. We cannot hope to win unless we revive the lost art of remembering on a massive scale.
This is an excellent and thorough analysis, the best I've seen.I have some minor quibbles:Is Qaddafi socialist? Was he ever?This question shouldn't matter. Whether he or the government is socialist should not justify U. S. intervention, but the reality is that the only countries in the Middle East and North Africa where the U. S. is actively attempting to overthrow the governments are Libya and Syria, both of which call themselves socialist. Is that a coincidence? Is it a further coincidence that the only domestic "terrorist" organization that the FBI is pursuing with a witch hunt and grand jury investigation is Freedom Road Socialist Organization for "illegal contacts" with Palestinians and FARC? [For the definiitive rejoinder to that attack, please see "God and the FBI" by Janis Ian: http://wammtoday.wordpress.com/2011/04/16/youtube-god-and-the-fbi/]I'm not going to defend Kaddafi. He's not Olof Palme, but Libya is not Sweden. I think it's great that there is free education and free health care, and I appreciate that he says he is socializing the oil wealth. I'm sure he corrupt and meglomaniacal. Frankly, I don't care. That is a matter for Libyans. My concern is with U. S. policy because I am an American citizen, and U. S. policy (foreign and domestic) for the last 100 years has been anti-socialist. Therefore, I am reflexively an anti-anti-socialist.The question of whether the U. S. should ever intervene anywhere cannot be answered in absolute terms. Of course the U. S. should have intervened in Darfur and in East Timor. But rather than independent U. S. intervention, which can be a cover for imperialist design, the U. S. should sponsor and support U. N. intervention to strengthen their role as keeper of the world's peace.But, aside from these questions, thank you for the thorough analysis.Ed FelienMinneapolis-----Original Message-----
From: progressive@yahoogroups.com [mailto:progressive@yahoogroups.com]On Behalf Of wytheholt@cox.net
Sent: Saturday, April 16, 2011 8:19 AM
Subject: [progressive] Is Kaddafi a socialist? WAS HE EVER?Stephen Shalom & Michael Albert Answer Questions on Libya
Z-Net
April 7, 2011
1. Is Qaddafi socialist? Was he ever?
Socialists believe that people should democratically and collectively
control all aspects of their lives. Qaddafi has ruled Libya as an
absolute dictator -- the very antithesis of socialism -- for more than
four decades. The fact that he calls his political system a direct
democracy is as relevant as the fact that East Germany used to call
itself a People's Democracy or that the Pentagon calls itself the
Defense Department.
It is true that Libya, because of its oil wealth, has a relatively high
human development index (HDI), a UN-developed measure that takes account
of income, literacy, and life expectancy. But this no more makes it
socialist than the even higher HDIs of the United Arab Emirates, Qatar,
Bahrain, and Kuwait, or the roughly equivalent HDI of Saudi Arabia make
any of them socialist.
2. Is Qaddafi an anti-imperialist? Was he ever?
When Qaddafi deposed the Libyan king in 1969, U.S. policy makers
[NIXON! -- WH] judged
him to be thoroughly anti-communist and a useful bulwark against a more
radical regime. For example, he turned over for execution the leaders of
a left-wing coup attempt against the pro-U.S. regime in Sudan, and aided
pro-Western Oman in its war against the Dhofar guerrillas. "I guess we
were kind of euphoric about him at first," said former Secretary of
State William Rogers.
But Qaddafi soon came into conflict with U.S. oil companies and
challenged other imperial interests in the region, turning himself into
a major enemy of the U.S. government. Washington accused him of
terrorism -- which was true, though on a smaller scale than that being
carried out by the U.S.-backed Salvadoran regime -- and tried its best
to undermine his rule.
Then, in 2003, Qaddafi agreed to end his weapons of mass destruction
programs and his support for terrorism, and to pay $1.5 billion to
settle the Lockerbie bombing case, in return for re-establishing ties
with the United States. Qaddafi then became a close partner with
Washington in its "war on terror." (Ibn al-Sheikh al-Libi, the captured
al-Qaeda operative who, under torture, gave false information regarding
Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, was secretly sent home to Libya by
the CIA; when he was discovered in a Libyan prison by a human rights
researcher, he conveniently committed suicide.) In 2009, Senators
McCain, Lieberman, and Graham met with Qaddafi, praising him as an
"important ally" in the "war on terror" and promising to help his air
force secure delivery of 8 transport planes. Qaddafi had also developed
especially warm relations with the rightwing Italian prime minister,
Silvio Berlusconi, including shared family business investments.
3. Is Qaddafi not socialist and not anti-imperialist, but a progressive
in the Arab world?
Qaddafi lent support to several progressive struggles over the years.
But he also was a leading backer of many of the most brutal and corrupt
dictators in Africa, as well as murderous insurgents such as Liberia's
Charles Taylor and Sierra Leone's Foday Sankoh. When the Arab Spring
came to Tunisia, Qaddafi declared that Ben Ali was the best leader
Tunisians would ever have.
Some have been impressed that Qaddafi's bodyguards are all female, but
more telling is the fact that his regime arbitrarily detains women in
"social rehabilitation" facilities for alleged transgressions of moral
codes, locking them up indefinitely without due process.
The Libyan Government told the UN's Committee to End Racial
Discrimination (CERD) that "It is possible to state categorically that
there is no racial discrimination of any kind in Libya," because Libya
has no "religious or ethnic communities that are defined by their
religion, race, language, gender, colour, or political affiliations."
CERD, however, noted the rather glaring "discrepancy" between Libya's
claim and "information indicating that Amazigh, Tuareg, and Black
African populations live in the country."
Far from being colorblind,
Gaddafi has collaborated with the rightwing Berlusconi government in
Italy in blocking African refugees from Europe, declaring in Rome in
2010: "what will be the reaction of the white and Christian Europeans
faced with this influx of starving and ignorant Africans...We don't know
if Europe will remain an advanced and united continent, or if it will be
destroyed, as happened with the barbarian invasions."
4. Are critics of Qaddafi's human rights record just the powerful
Western states?
The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights pointed to the "callous
disregard for the rights and freedoms of Libyans that had marked the
almost four decade long grip on power by the current ruler."
On March 1, 2011, the General Assembly by acclamation suspended Libya
from membership on the UN Human Rights Council, the first country ever
to be suspended. The UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearances expressed deep concern about allegations received,
according to which hundreds of enforced disappearances have been
committed over the last few months in Libya.
On March 25, the newly operational African Court on Human and Peoples'
Rights demanded that Libya refrain from any action that would result in
loss of life or physical integrity of persons.
The Organization of the Islamic Conference condemned the Libyan
government's excessive use of force against civilians.
5. Who is the opposition to Qaddafi in Libya?
As in all the uprisings occurring across the Arab world, the opposition
in Libya is very broadly based. It includes students, human rights
activists, Islamic fundamentalists, tribal elements, low income working
people, better- off lawyers, doctors, engineers, etc., some small
business people, and even some with major property holdings, as well as
defecting members of the government, including some who resigned in
outrage over Qaddafi's attacks on civilians, and others trying to save
their skins.
The various components of the opposition differ on many issues, but what
unites them is a belief that Qaddafi must go and that the Libyan people
are entitled to some sort of democratic society. Their program seeks a
bourgeois democratic state, with regular elections, civil liberties,
women's rights, and religious freedom.
The opposition seems to have no significant left presence. And a Libya
that reflected the views of its people would surely have a substantial
Islamic influence. But a Libya with the possibility of democratic
contestation would allow for the rebuilding of the left, something
impossible under Qaddafi.
The more the opposition becomes dependent on military means, the more
influence will be accorded to those within their ranks with military
skills, which means defecting soldiers, those with experience fighting
in Iraq or Afghanistan, or those connected to past paramilitary groups.
The more dependent the opposition becomes on the Western powers, the
more influence will be accorded to those with connections to and views
compatible with these powers.
6. What is the role of al Qaeda and other Islamic fundamentalists in the
opposition?
No one knows. There are certainly some of the former and more of the
latter involved, and these may represent a larger fraction of those with
military experience. What is significant, however, is that the U.S.
Government -- whom one can assume would be especially vigilant to avoid
strengthening al Qaeda -- does not consider this a major concern.
U.S. officials believe that there are a relatively small number of
Islamist fighters in Libya and their role is limited. (Yes, Washington
happily used Islamic fundamentalists against progressives or the Soviet
Union in the past, but U.S. collaboration with Qaddafi in recent years
in the "war on terror" indicates which one U.S. policy makers consider
the greater evil.)
7. Has the opposition conducted pogroms against African immigrants in
Libya?
There have been credible reports of serious abuse in opposition
held-areas of workers from sub-Saharan Africa who have been falsely
accused of being mercenaries recruited by Qadaffi, and of killings by
the opposition of prisoners of war suspected of being mercenaries.
According to Na'eem Jeenah, executive director of the Afro-Middle East
Centre in Johannesburg, South Africa, "Certainly, Qadaffi has used, in
the past, mercenaries from other parts of Africa, and our information is
that some of these are likely involved in the current situation on
Qadaffi's side." But this is obviously not a justification for
mistreating foreign workers or prisoners.
There is a long history of pervasive anti-black racism in Libya, and
such attitudes no doubt are present among the opposition. The Qadaffi
government has contributed to the spreading of these retrograde views.
In 2000, government officials blamed African migrant workers for rising
crime, disease, and drug trafficking, and dozens of these workers were
killed in the streets. The "vast majority" of migrants interviewed by
Human Rights Watch reported having "seen or experienced physical
harassment or violence ... often with little intervention by the
police," and sometimes carried out by the police.
Racism, and racial discrimination must be unequivocally condemned, as
must the mistreatment of prisoners. But there is no basis for claiming
that the reports of mistreatment represent the basic nature of the
opposition. The initial reports of killings have not been repeated, the
rebel's Interim National Council has aired a statement promising to
respect the rights of religious and ethnic minorities, and there is
video showing opposition members protecting an alleged captured
mercenary from abuse.
8. What are the overall aims of U.S. foreign policy? Is morality a
significant goal of U.S. foreign policy?
In President Obama's speech regarding Libya he was quite forthright
about this. We cannot intervene everywhere there is injustice or even
threat of massacre, and we should not, he told the public. Where then
should we employ our assets? Where our "interests and values" are at
stake, he decreed. And then two sentences later the figleaf rationale
that the word "values" connotes disappeared as he reported that "we must
always measure our interests against the need for action."
So at the very most "values" -- which rhetorically suggest freedom,
dignity, etc., but more technically in government-speak typically mean
open markets, private ownership, etc. -- enter in only after it has been
determined that "our interests" warrant actions.
But who does "our" refer to? And what is meant by "interests."
U.S. foreign policy pursues U.S. international interests. These are not,
however, the interests of the U.S. population-- much less respected aims
such as justice, legality, or freedom. Instead, U.S. international
interests are the interests of U.S. elites, meaning the class of
property owners plus various political decision makers and other
wealthy, empowered sectors.
But what are these elite interests that flow from the structure of
American industry and polity? "Our interests" are that U.S. foreign
policy should maximize profits of U.S.-based corporations as well as
U.S. influence over world events.
This general aim becomes wired into the make-up and behavior of people
who succeed in elite positions -- and this includes not just those
holding government office, but key media roles as well. However, even if
this aim didn't penetrate elite actors' personal mindsets and
preferences, it is compelled by the competitive and other structural
features of business and policy making: those who don't pursue "our
interests" are removed.
Presidents and pundits alike of course claim "our interests" are humane
and caring -- since claiming so helps to engender support for pursuit of
sordid interests. However, this is no different from other imperial
powers claiming their interests are humane, including even the most
blatant butchers and bandits.
In the end, U.S. policy makers pay attention to popular and
international dissent only insofar as either could threaten future elite
aims. Profits and power trump all other concerns. Humanitarianism arises
only as rationalization, or sometimes tangentially when consistent with
the dominant aims.
9. What have been the more specific general aims of the U.S. in the
Middle East and north Africa?
The region is rich in oil and oil is the energy source and lubricant of
international commerce and transport, both private and military. A
primary goal in the area, therefore, is to exploit, and even more to
control the dispersal of oil. We know this is the aim in the region not
solely because it corresponds to logic and to our understanding of the
involved institutions and actors, or because it is utterly obvious from
U.S. actions for decades, but also because U.S. policy admit it: the
State Department stated in 1945 that Middle East oil was "a stupendous
source of strategic power, and one of the greatest material prizes in
world history."
Friendly dictatorships are welcome. Hillary Clinton, well before the
recent events, described U.S. hopes for Libya: "I am very pleased to
welcome Minister Qadaffi [a son] here to the State Department. We deeply
value the relationship between the United States and Libya. We have many
opportunities to deepen and broaden our cooperation. And I'm very much
looking forward to building on this relationship." And, indeed, the
relation has been undeniably warm and cozy since 2003.
Of course one could also point elsewhere in the region, to Egypt's
Mubarak, to the Saudi royal family, and so on, to see how our supposed
and widely proclaimed humanitarian impulses fare against the contrary
implications of "our interests." In typical times, U.S. support for
dictators and even kings is considered wise, prudent, and even moral
because it abets "our" agenda of profit and power which, in the region,
largely means controlling access to oil and supporting supine regimes
willing to further our interests.
10. What are the most likely specific aims of the U.S. in Libya right
now? Why did the U.S. intervene?
Recent events throughout the Middle East and north Africa were not
foreseen, nor sought, by Western or any other states, though they are
incredibly important to Western and all other states.
Washington's concerns regarding what has been called the Arab Spring
involve oil access and domination. The daily life circumstances of the
people of the region are simply irrelevant. As evidence, we note that
the United States has routinely supported all manner of horrendous
regimes there, and elsewhere, with zero concern for affected
populations. For example, the Obama administration continues the
decades-long close U.S. relationship with the incredibly repressive
Saudi royal family. Washington decried Mubarak only when he could no
longer hold on to power, trying to insinuate itself with his successors,
ignoring its decades of support for him. The same goes for U.S. support
to Qaddafi. Indeed, Obama would be continuing relations unchanged with
Mubarak and Qaddafi, and not just the Saudi royal family, but for recent
unanticipated, uninvited, and -- for Washington -- unwanted, events.
Revolts started breaking out across the Arab world, however, and
threatened U.S. interests. In accord with U.S. policy making more
generally, as soon as the situation became evident Washington's priority
predictably shifted to mitigating the dangers associated with the Arab
uprisings, or, if possible, channeling them into paths benefitting U.S.
power and profits.
This has called for different choices in different places. In Egypt the
U.S. had to basically watch, and now the U.S. works, no doubt
double-time, to try to insinuate Egyptian actors friendly to U.S.
corporate interests into the new government.
In Bahrain it has meant accepting the Saudi Kingdom's repressive
intervention to try to forestall dangerous dissidence, due to the
extreme costs of failing to retain influence there, including possibly
losing the option of housing the Fifth Fleet.
In Libya, given Qaddafi's instability and the large opposition, and
given the danger of a massacre that would be blamed on the U.S., the
U.S. was backed into having to take action. Against its preferred agenda
for the area, which was stable docility imposed by authoritarian
regimes, including Qaddafi's, the U.S. has thus had to relate to the
upheaval, even risking more instability.
Note that it wasn't the tally of dead Libyans if Qaddafi entered
Benghazi that mattered to U.S. policy makers, as it would matter to a
humanitarian, but it was instead the cost of being accused of ignoring
Libyan pleas for help, as well as the effect on Europe of a flood of
immigrants, both concerns brazenly admitted by Obama himself saying "we
knew that if we waited one more day, Benghazi -- a city nearly the size
of Charlotte -- could suffer a massacre that would have reverberated
across the region and stained the conscience of the world.... It was not
in our national interest to let that happen.... A massacre would have
driven thousands of additional refugees across Libya's borders."
Proximate, detailed short run goals in Libya are impossible to know for
sure, but the broad overarching goals seem quite obvious. The events
threaten U.S. interests so policy makers seek to engineer outcomes that
will minimize that threat and, if possible, even yield new benefits. By
providing military support, weapons, and anything else Washington can
offer without tangentially incurring undo risk to what it is trying to
protect -- which is U.S. profits and power -- the United States hopes to
wind up with a new government headed by pro-U.S. sectors and individuals
with minimal disruption to U.S. interests in the region.
11. What is the CIA's role in the opposition?
Given U.S. motives are to insure that post-crisis outcomes are as
positive as possible for U.S. regional dominance with zero regard for
the well being of Libyans, we can pretty confidently deduce the role of
the CIA in Libya, which will be to do a certain amount of tactical
activity, perhaps including some assassination or other violent
activity, but mostly to gather information and to create personal and
working ties and especially develop connections to possible new
government officials and influential actors in Libyan society. They will
also presumably help with targeting for air strikes.
No doubt the CIA had, even before the uprising, contacts among
dissidents and even greater numbers of contacts with the Qaddafi
government. This does not mean that the opposition can be seen as a pawn
of the CIA any more than it means that Qaddafi's government which had
been working closely with the CIA since 2003 was or is a pawn of the
CIA. Still more untenable is to claim that the popular uprising against
Qaddafi was a CIA plot. That the CIA will try to get the best possible
outcomes for U.S. elites is a truism. How well it will succeed, or fail,
depends on many variables, not least informed opposition.
12. Why, in general, should we oppose intervention by Western powers in
the affairs of other states?
There are many reasons to reject foreign intervention. People should be
allowed to decide their own affairs without outside intervention. The
act of a people pursuing their own interests develops their capacity for
self-determination in a way that even (improbably) humanitarian outside
intervention cannot.
If the outside intervention is military in nature, again even if it is
improbably well-intended, it may undercut opportunities for peaceful
resolution. And military actions (whether from inside or outside) tend
to strengthen the hand of those with military means, not those with the
best values. But mainly, even with initially improbably good intentions,
outsiders will almost always act so as to further their own interests,
and at best only secondarily those of victimized people.
More typically, when outsiders are quite obviously acting out of
self-interest, as in the case of the United States, they will try to
control events for their own purposes rather than for any humanitarian
end. Intervention will tend to give outsiders more leverage over
internal developments, allowing outsiders to subvert potential
long-range progressive outcomes.
Outsiders, especially those with an imperial history, will often provoke
extreme nationalist hostility trumping any other more positive results.
Interventions, even if tangentially valuable in a particular case, may
set a precedent for other, not necessarily valuable interventions, and
may loosen the general constraint against intervention. Consider an
example: Should police engage in a warrantless search even in a case
where they know it will have positive social benefit? Doing so, however,
will make it easier for warrantless searches where there is social harm,
and that's why we favor a general rule against warrantless searches.
In addition, outside interventions will often strengthen the hand of the
outsiders (unless they get horribly bogged down, as happened to the
United States in Vietnam and Iraq, or the Soviet Union in Afghanistan),
increasing their capabilities for future unjustified interventions
elsewhere.
13. Should opposition to Western intervention be an absolute principle,
and if not, what guidelines should apply in the case of exceptions.
Even wise absolute principles often break down in extreme cases,
particularly when the principles themselves are derived from contextual
considerations. For example, where large numbers of lives might be at
stake, intervention might be justified, but only if the benefits exceed
the full costs of the intervention, including both in the immediate
situation and more broadly in terms of such considerations as bad
precedents.
Different forms and degrees of intervention will likely have different
likely costs and possible benefits so the guidelines for those rare
cases where the presumption against foreign intervention ought to be
overridden include: minimize the scale of the intervention, minimize the
degree of influence and control accorded to the foreign interveners, and
constrain as much as possible the degree to which the interveners can
act with their own discretion.
14. Was Libya a case where an exception to the argument against
intervention applied?
Qaddafi's forces were on the outskirts of Benghazi, the opposition
stronghold with some 700,000 people. His military units had repeatedly
used lethal violence -- including air power -- against unarmed
demonstrators. Qaddafi didn't try to argue that the killings were the
work of overzealous subordinates; rather he declared that he had done
nothing that Israel hadn't done in Gaza -- maybe true, but hardly an
exoneration for anyone who cares about justice. Qaddafi declared as well
that anyone who didn't love him didn't deserve to live and that he would
hunt down his opponents house to house; "There will be no mercy. Our
troops will be coming to Benghazi tonight."
One of course doesn't know what would have happened had Qaddafi's forces
taken Bengahzi. But the prospect of a major atrocity was entirely
plausible.
The Libyan opposition asked for a no-fly zone, while rejecting any
foreign ground troops. It seemed that a limited military action that
declared a no-fly zone and kept tanks away from Benghazi could save many
lives without incurring too many of the adverse consequences of
intervention. There being no ground forces would make it harder for
outsiders to control the situation. A well-defined and limited military
action would not give foreign powers the ability to make crucial
decisions, would not be long enough to evoke a nationalist backlash, and
would cause minimal collateral damage.
15. Were there other means on March 17 of preventing a massacre in
Benghazi?
Several alternatives were proposed to avert a massacre in Benghazi. All
had their problems.
* Peaceful settlement. Had Qaddafi's forces halted their advance before
reaching Beghazi, talks and mediation might have enabled a solution
without recourse to foreign military action. But when the Qaddafi regime
declared its support for a ceasefire, yet continued to push its armored
column toward Benghazi, talks could not address the urgent situation.
* Arm the opposition. Arming rebels often provides less leverage to
outsiders and provokes less nationalistic backlash than does direct
foreign military participation. The fact that arming rebels accords less
control over the rebels and their weapons in the future is one reason
why major powers are often reluctant to employ this approach. It is of
course still a form of intervention and there is the possibility that an
outsider who is the sole weapons supplier can achieve decisive control
by turning on and off the arms spigot. Nevertheless, this option was not
adequate to address the imminent fall of Benghazi. Getting arms in and
people learning how to use them takes time, and could not have had an
immediate effect.
* Send in some sort of peacekeeping force -- UN, Arab League, Egyptian
-- to protect the civilian population. This is quicker than arming the
rebels, but slower than air strikes, and unless started much earlier not
quick enough for Benghazi. There is also the danger that peacekeepers
might pursue the interests of various outsiders, and, having boots on
the ground, will be better situated to control events.
* Persevere with non-violent struggle. The experience of non-violent
struggle, even in the face of ruthless dictators, has often shown that
it can achieve social change at lower human cost than armed struggle. It
is unclear whether this possibility was foreclosed in Libya by Qaddafi's
actions or by mistaken choices of the opposition. Either way, however,
it may not have been relevant to Benghazians on March 17.
16. How do you assess UN SC Resolution 1973?
Had there been a UN resolution narrowly tailored to address the
immediate threat of massacre and carefully constrained to avoid putting
things in the hands of the leading Western powers, this might indeed
have been an exception to the usual arguments against intervention.
Resolution 1973, however, was not narrowly tailored at all. It
appropriately authorized steps to protect civilians and precluded
foreign occupation. But it left the definition of these things entirely
up to the states that took it upon themselves to take "all necessary
measures." And although it provided that the intervening states had to
report to the Secretary General on what actions they were taking, and
"coordinate closely" with him, it provided no real mechanisms for doing so.
Consider a few decisions that were made:
* In establishing a no-fly zone, should hundreds of targets across the
country be struck? In Bosnia there was a UN-imposed no-fly zone where
planes and anti-aircraft facilities were not preemptively attacked. Thus
it is possible to institute a no-fly zone without first launching
multiple attacks. Was this possible or advisable in the Libyan case?
That is debatable, but why should the matter be left up to the U.S.
government to decide? (Presumably it's safer for U.S. pilots to perform
no-fly duties after 120 Tomahawks have hit targets, but it might be
safer for Libyan civilians in Tripoli to withhold the Tomahawks unless
and until anti-aircraft weapons are fired.)
* Attacks were made on Libyan government command-and-control facilities,
including a headquarters where Qaddafi may have been. (Recall that in
1986 the U.S. bombed Qaddafi's barracks in Tripoli and Benghazi, on the
grounds that these were the command-and-control centers for terrorism.)
Perhaps an argument can be made that it is justified to assassinate a
leader if doing so will save large numbers of lives. But is this really
the sort of decision that should be left up to London, Paris, and
Washington to decide?
In addition, and worst of all, the resolution does not specify when
military action should stop. It is apparently up to the intervening
powers to make this determination.
So, in our view, resolution 1973 was not the sort of limited and focused
resolution that might have been justified to avert slaughter in Benghazi.
17. Have the US and its allies adhered to the letter and spirit of
Resolution 1973?
Even though resolution 1973 had inadequate controls on the actions of
those taking the "all necessary measures" to protect civilians, it had
some restrictions, and these have been violated. Several countries that
supported the resolution in the Security Council have stated that they
considered the way it was being carried out to go beyond the terms of
the resolution.
So, for example, while hitting tanks that were about to break into
Benghazi could be justified on the basis of saving civilians, hitting
tanks in retreat or Libyan government forces in Sirte, one of the few
places where Qaddafi had significant support, had little to do with
protecting civilians from imminent massacre.
18. Can someone have favored a "no-fly" zone and associated bombardment,
yet be a staunch advocate of national self-determination and a stalwart
opponent of imperialism in all its forms?
Yes. A person could fully understand the more gross military and also
more subtle manipulative dangers of U.S. involvement for Libya and by
precedent more widely as well, but still feel that to reject a no-fly
policy and some additional defense for civilians would have meant, or
would still mean, a massacre disastrous not only for those assaulted,
but also for the direction of Libya and the region.
Believing these implications, one might then say, I cannot stand U.S.
foreign policy in this or any other case due to its obviously imperial
priorities, and I will of course work hard to mitigate and reverse
problems incurred as a result of those priorities, but I must
nonetheless support no-fly and attendant acts because the costs of not
having no-fly would be greater.
Such a person is thinking clearly and evidencing fine and worthy values,
whether his or her assessment of the likely implications is correct or not.
19. Conversely, can someone have opposed a "no-fly" zone and yet care
about the well-being of Libyans?
Yes. A person could fully understand the horrible ramifications of
Qaddafi utilizing his advanced armaments without being restrained by
external force and be sick over the carnage that would result, yet
nonetheless feel that external force would be so likely to morph into
even greater carnage as well as imposing no chance of uncorrupted
opposition victory that he or she had to oppose it.
Such a person is thinking clearly and evidencing fine and worthy values,
whether his or her assessment of the likely implications is correct or not.
20. Okay, which view did you hold?
We did not reject out of hand the idea of a no-fly zone or even a no-fly
zone plus a no-drive zone around Benghazi. The danger was real and the
humanitarian stakes significant. But the response had to be one that
minimized the attendant costs by carefully constraining the discretion
of the United States and the other Western powers, and by restricting
the scale and the duration of the action. So constrained and restricted,
a no-fly zone could have saved many lives without excessive adverse
consequences.
Resolution 1973, however, was too open-ended. The good that would be
obtained by preventing a massacre would likely be exceeded by the
negative costs of enlarged intervention -- in Libya (civilian deaths
from collateral damage, weakening the independence of the opposition,
encouraging the move from a political struggle to a military one, giving
Qaddafi a nationalist image) and beyond (making it easier for imperial
powers to intervene in the future).
But we found the situation to be very tough: and we appreciate that
contrary views could be consistent with our values. We don't and can't
know what scale of massacre would have occurred without Resolution 1973.
We don't know how effective a more restrictive Resolution would have
been. We don't know the extent to which international outrage can and
will restrain the intervention. We don't know how much harm the
intervention will impose, with and without restraints. Historical
judgements are hard.
We don't think it makes sense to point fingers in either direction
because such behavior is counter-productive and also because in this
case the general lessons to be drawn actually have little to do with
proximate right and wrong for Libya -- which determination is literally
unique to Libya's case -- but, instead, have to do with how to think
about the issues and how to relate to others once one has a view.
21. What could both sides of this debate agree on going forward?
Despite their differences on the question of the no-fly zone, both sides
agree on several key points.
Neither supports Qaddafi, and both support the Arab revolution.
Both sides agree too that there are very powerful general arguments
against foreign intervention. While the two sides disagree on whether
the urgency of preventing a massacre outweighed the negative costs in
this case, both sides agree that the negative costs are not outweighed
in the case of helping one side in a civil war, however worthy, to
defeat its opponents. Therefore, both sides oppose the ongoing bombing
being conducted on behalf of the rebels, particularly when the rebels
are going on the offensive.
Both sides also agree that the motives of the United States, the UK, and
France are geo political self-interest, not humanitarianism, and that it
is imperative to obstruct and hopefully prevent them from subverting and
or bending events throughout the Mideast and north Africa to their own
ends.
Of course both sides agree on opposing U.S. or any other foreign
military bases in Libya. But their agreement can go beyond this in
demanding that there be no financial, political or military
aggrandizement for Washington or the other interveners as a result of
the intervention.
The logic is rather elementary in other domains. Consider an executor
who is entrusted with administering a fund on behalf of a victim needing
help. If the executor were to make decisions based on maximizing his or
her own income, this would clearly be unethical and would expose as
totally fraudulent any claims by the executor to be acting in the best
interests of the victim. Ethical principles preclude such self-enrichment.
Translated to Libya, we can insist on the same ethical principle: no
outsider should be benefiting from a claimed humanitarian intervention.
Therefore, we should demand that the U.S., the UK, and France -- and
whoever else becomes involved -- should foreswear any financial,
political, or military benefit resulting from the intervention.
This demand "Libya for Libyans, not outsiders," could galvanize
movements opposed to enlarging the military intervention and eager to
prevent occupation to a far more radical stance for Libya that would
also establish precedents bearing on events all over the world, even as
it would elevate humanitarian concerns to paramount position.
22. How can typically anti-interventionist and anti-war activists who
disagreed drastically about supporting or not supporting the initial
Libya intervention work effectively together?
Those who share an opposition to imperialism and to Arab dictators,
including Qaddafi, can work together on the many points on which they
agree.
There is nothing in the disagreement about no-fly that precludes having
a movement in which there are different views, at least for all those
who want to aid Libyans and restrain the U.S. This should be obvious,
and indeed, if disagreeing about difficult contextual judgments implied
an inability to work together in an overarching movement, we would be
doomed. It is not only possible but inevitable, that any massive
anti-war movement, or peace movement, or justice movement of any kind,
will contain many different ideas and priorities among its participants
within a broader framework of agreement.
Of course, the different points of view on the initial no-fly zone need
to be vigorously debated. But this doesn't mean denouncing each other as
the enemy or impugning each other's motives or political credentials.
Instead what is needed is a little humility toward the possibility of
being wrong and thus a little willingness to take seriously other's
views, and a little recognition that people can have broadly similar
values and ultimate aims, and see even the same evidence, and yet arrive
at different positions on important short term issues.
By contrast, folks with inflexible and unyielding mindsets will often
split over their differences, or maintain at best tenuous relations that
obstruct successful practice. More, they may regard people outside the
movement with the same type of dismissive and denigrating judgments.
23. What tactics and demands may succeed in limiting the current Libyan
intervention and preventing subsequent occupation?
The U.S. government seeks to defend elite interests. Unfolding
conditions in Libya will of course affect its calculus. For movements to
affect it as well requires sending elites the message that if they
persist in trying to control outcomes in Libya opposition will grow,
broaden, and deepen to the point where the dangers of losing power and
profits are more risky if they continue their interventionist policies
than if they relent.
For a movement to be very militant but small or shrinking will not send
that message. For a movement to be very narrowly focused will also not
pose a particularly serious threat. What will turn elite heads is a
movement steadily growing in size, in means of manifesting itself, in
militance, and in diversity of aims -- and thus threatening an ongoing
threat to power and profits.
This suggests that movements should go multi focus as much as possible,
addressing with visible placards and demands issues of foreign policy
but also of race and gender, the economy, the legal system, etc.
Movements should welcome diversity of all kinds as much as possible,
foster militance but not at the expense of growth, and create movement
relations that sustains members and deepens member commitment rather
than frustrating members and leading to member attrition.
People will have diverse ideas about how to best accomplish all these
ends, but if movements follow the precept of making room for difference,
not least to discover rather than merely to argue about what works best,
gains will influence policy.
http://www.zcommunications.org/stephen-shalom-and-michael-albert-answer-question
s-on-libya-by-stephen-shalom
--
I want to play in your town for you and 2 of your friends.
http://eventful.com/performers/matt-love-/P0-001-000156481-4/demands
